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Abstract—In FPGA applications in space, implementations are
generally protected using radiation-error mitigation techniques
such as triple modular redundancy. For high-performance sys-
tems, such fault tolerance techniques can prove problematic due
to large power overhead. This paper presents a case study on the
Digital Receiver System (DRS) in the Netherlands-China Low-
frequency Explorer (NCLE), which is implemented using a Xilinx
Kintex 7 SRAM FPGA. Estimates for the critical cross-section
of the system are presented, as well as estimated fault rates for a
five-year mission to the second Earth-Moon Lagrange point. This
includes simulations on the expected radiation environment, an
analysis on the applicability of the used Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA in
these conditions and an analysis on the feasibility of implementing
the DRS with minimal mitigation techniques for this mission. The
steps performed during the analysis are described in detail, as to
provide a guideline for replicating such an analysis for different
space missions.
Index Terms—FPGA, fault tolerance, space missions, radiation
error mitigation, Kintex 7
I. INTRODUCTION
The Netherlands-China Low-frequency Explorer (NCLE) is
a low-frequency radio instrument payload aboard the Chinese
Chang’e 4 relay satellite. This satellite is scheduled to be
launched to the second Earth-Moon Lagrange point (L2)
in 2018. Its goal is to collect astrophysical data at radio
frequencies below 80MHz, in order to form a low frequency
sky map and to attempt astrophysical study of the cosmic
dawn, along with several other science objectives. The NCLE
will be the first international payload on a Chinese space
mission, and the first Dutch instrument to be sent to (and
beyond) the Moon.
The NCLE Digital Receiver System (DRS), implemented
using a Xilinx Kintex 7 SRAM FPGA, is tasked with pro-
cessing and storing the data obtained from three monopole
antennas. This processing entails large Fourier transforms, as
well as filtering operations. There is an average power budget
of approximately 3 Watts for the FPGA. The reason for this
is not a shortage of power; the limiting factor is the amount
of heat that can be dissipated, as the capsule in which the
payload resides is not pressurized. Neither convective nor
liquid cooling is available, putting a severe limit on the amount
of power that can be dissipated without the system heating up
to dangerous temperatures.
Because of the small power budget and high performance
requirements, an efficient implementation of the system is
imperative, in order to allow continuous measurements to be
performed. The system could operate on a sub-100% duty
cycle to allow the components to cool down after a time of
intensive processing, but this could interfere with a number of
the science goals and should preferably be avoided.
The Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA is known to be susceptible to
radiation-induced upsets [1], which may introduce faults in the
computed results. Traditionally, fault tolerance techniques such
as triple modular redundancy (TMR) are used [2] to mitigate or
eliminate these faults. However, these techniques incur signifi-
cant overhead, dramatically increasing both the required FPGA
area and the required power. For example, TMR increases both
the required area and power by approximately a factor of three.
Overhead in this order of magnitude would likely under-
mine a portion of the desired science goals, as smaller-than-
preferred Fourier transformations would have to be used,
reducing the quality of the gathered science data.
This paper describes a case study on whether it would be
a viable approach to implement the system with only limited
application of fault tolerance techniques in the design. Section
II shows a more elaborate overview of the mission and its
goals, and Section III gives an overview of the logical lay-out
and physical situation of the NCLE payload in the Chang’e 4
relay satellite. Section IV discusses simulation results of the
radiation environment at the mission destination, in order to
provide an estimate for the expected radiation sustained by the
system over the mission duration.
After that, Section V gives an overview of the susceptibility
of the system to various types of radiation errors and degen-
erative effects, as well as their impact on the system. Where
applicable, vulnerable cross-sections are determined.
Section VI provides an attempt at quantifying two defini-
tions of the critical cross-section of the FPGA implementation:
faults that propagate to the observed data, as well as the
subset of those faults which have a significant and possibly
catastrophic effect on the science data, together with their
respective estimated incident rates.
II. MISSION OVERVIEW
The NCLE is expected to operate in the second Earth-Moon
Lagrange point for a mission duration of between three and
five years. It is set to collect astrophysical science data in the
Fig. 1. The prototype of the NCLE Digital Receiver System, in development.
The FPGA board is mounted on a backplane together with the ADC board,
which will be connected to the antenna system.
range below 80 MHz, observing several phenomena in specific
sub-sets of this band.
The different science cases require different types of data
being produced. In this paper, the term “science mode” refers
to an application running on the FPGA, collecting data for a
specific science case. The various science modes are mostly
run on a sequential schedule, although data collection for at
least one of the burst phenomena (Jovian S-bursts) is planned
to be implemented as a triggered mode.
For observations on static emission sources such as the
galactic background or the cosmic dawn signal, there is no
requirement on the time resolution. This means these science
modes can average large amounts of measurements into single
data points, improving the effective sensitivity.
Other science cases, such as measuring specific planetary
emissions, do have set temporal resolution requirements. Typi-
cally this is in the range of one second (Earth Radio-Frequency
Interference) to ten seconds (Auroral Kilometric Radiation),
meaning significant amounts of averaging is still performed
for each data point.
Exceptions are measurements on Jovian S-bursts, giant
pulses and pulsar emissions, which have temporal resolution
requirements in the range of milliseconds. Note that due to
the limited downlink bandwidth to Earth, the observation time
of these science modes is limited to an order of seconds. The
significance of these requirements with respect to the radiation
fault impact on the system is clarified in Section VII.
III. SYSTEM SET-UP
The prototype of the NCLE DRS is pictured in Fig. 1. In
this picture, the longer board sticking out from the backplane
is the studied FPGA board containing a Xilinx XC7K160T.
This board contains the data flash memory as well. The
shorter board contains three ADC channels, servicing the three
antennas on the NCLE.
On the other side of the backplane, pins are broken out
to allow the command and data handling system (CDHS)
access to the configuration flash, making it possible to track
housekeeping data and push updates to the FPGA design.
Fig. 2. Five-year ionizing dose in near Earth interplanetary orbit at 1.0 AU
from the sun, starting from March 2018. Results obtained from SHIELDOSE
simulations via Spenvis.
CDHS is tasked with communicating gathered science data
back to Earth, and it also acts as a monitor for the DRS FPGA:
it can restart and reconfigure the FPGA if this is deemed
necessary.
The DRS board will operate in a vacuum environment
which, as mentioned in the introduction, inhibits cooling. B
A passive heat-coupling system is currently being designed,
which is expected to allow the FPGA to operate at safe
temperatures with an average power usage of between 3 and
4 Watts.
At the time of writing, the shielding thickness is a to be
decided quantity. If no further justification is available, the
ESA standard recommends assuming 1 g/cm2 of shielding [3],
which is equivalent to approximately 3.7mm of aluminium.
However, as there was uncertainty within the project on
whether this amount of shielding would be present, a more
conservative estimate of 2mm of aluminium shielding was
used for the analysis.
IV. RADIATION ENVIRONMENT AT MISSION DESTINATION
Information about the radiation environment near the second
Earth-Moon Lagrange point is needed to provide a relevant
error model. Ideally, both the radiation dose and the spec-
trum shape of particle energies should be known, along with
the type of expected particles. The latter two determine the
effective LET (linear energy transfer) of the particles to the
device. The effective energy transfer of a particle impact is
(approximately linearly) related to upset rate [4, Fig. 1].
By combining the spectrum of expected LETs with the
effective cross-section of the device (faults per amount of
flux), the expected number of faults can be obtained. A more
thorough explanation of this is given in Section V.
A. Total dose estimates
Spenvis (the SPace ENVironment Information System by
ESA) [5] was used to find total dose estimates for a five-
year flight. As Spenvis does not contain a model for the L2
Fig. 3. Simulated five-year fluence plotted as LET spectrum, 2mm of Al
shielding.
orbit, it was approximated by an arbitrary point in space at
a distance of 1 AU from the sun. The simulation ignores the
intermittent shielding effect of the Moon and the Earth, as
well as the effects of intermittently passing through the Earth’s
magnetotail, but it should still provide a reasonable estimate.
From Spenvis, the SHIELDOSE-2Q [6] simulation was run
for a spherical aluminium shield around a silicon target. The
total dose results from this simulation can be found in Fig. 2.
These results show an estimated total dose of approximately
8 krad(Si) for 2mm of shielding.
B. Particle fluence estimates
Also using Spenvis, a prediction for the long-term LET
spectrum was obtained, with total fluence as a function of
particle energy transfer. These results can be found in Fig.
3. Note that the unit for integral fluence in this figure is
m−2sr−1: particles per area, per steradian.
The simulation calculates flux through a spherical shield,
hence the steradian in the unit. To convert these results to
particles hitting a flat surface of a certain area, it is necessary
to calculate the projection of the flat chip area to a sphere.
Integrating over both the azimuth and elevation, this boils
down to∫ pi
θ=0
∫ 2pi
φ=0
A |cos(θ) sin(θ)| dφ dθ = 2piA, (1)
i.e., the results should be multiplied by 2pi in order to get the
amount of particles per square meter per second. This results
in a total integral fluence of 1.056 ·1014m−2 over the mission
lifetime, equivalent to an average flux of 66.9 cm−2s−1.
C. Worst case flux
Due to the nature of varying solar conditions, average flux
can differ wildly from the worst case scenario. In additional
simulations, results for various worst case scenarios were
obtained. These results are shown in table I.
TABLE I
EXPECTED PARTICLE FLUX
Situation Flux (cm−2s−1)
average 6.69 · 101
worst week 6.37 · 103
worst day 2.93 · 104
worst 5 minutes 1.09 · 105
An important observation is that during the worst five
minutes, the expected flux is approximately 1600 times higher
than in the average case. In addition, this implies that in the
median situation, the flux is likely significantly lower than in
the average case.
V. OVERVIEW OF RADIATION ERRORS
Radiation errors in FPGAs come in several categories: Con-
figurable Logic Block (CLB) errors, BRAM upsets, configura-
tion (SRAM) upsets, destructive latch-ups and total ionization
dose failure. The following sections will go over each of
these, listing the effects, expected incident rate, and (if needed)
propose defensive strategies.
For single event effects, the effective cross-section of the
system is discussed. This is defined as the amount of events
per unit of fluence. It combines the probability that a particle
impact will cause an upset with the amount of particles passing
through the chip. The quantity of fluence is the inverse of area,
which makes area per bit (or area per system) the quantity for
the cross-section. A meaningful interpretation of this concept
is the critical area which a particle has to strike in order to
cause an event.
A. Destructive latch-ups
When a heavy ion strikes a silicon CMOS microcircuit,
there is a chance for a latch-up to occur: a self-sustaining
parasitic short-circuit, which draws high current and may break
the circuit due to high temperatures. Surprisingly, the Kintex
7 does not seem to suffer from the same destructive latch-ups
found in many other FPGAs [4] [7].
Heavy ion testing in the TAMU K500 Cyclotron facility
[4] has shown that latch-ups in the Kintex 7 only draw
approximately 125 mA from the VCCAUX line (1.8V, meant
for auxiliary circuits such as clock managers and dedicated
configuration pins), which is not enough to cause any lasting
damage to the circuit. The exact cause for the draw is not
clear.
In the initial tests, the FPGA is operated above its normal
operating voltage in order to trigger and study the latch-up
behavior. Additional testing in the same facility at nominal
voltages has shown that the event only occurs for very high
energy particles; the lowest effective LET at which this
phenomenon was observed is 1.5 · 104MeV cm2/g, at which
the estimated cross-section was determined as approximately
5 · 10−7 cm2.
These results were confirmed by heavy-ion tests at the
Cyclotron Resource Center in Louvain [7], where similar
behaviour was observed with a threshold SEL of 1.56 ·
104MeV cm2/g.
The expected five-year integral fluence in L2 for events of at
least this LET is only approximately 1.0 · 105 cm−2, meaning
the chance that a single event of this type occurs during the
five-year mission is approximately 5%. Results for additional
test are available [8], in which a Kintex 7 device is irradiated
with 1.9 ·1011 cm−2 fluence of 105 MeV protons. In this test,
not a single latch-up was detected.
An additional note from the Cyclotron Louvain tests is that
the latch-ups in the Kintex-7 do not seem to cause any loss
of part functionality. Power cycling the device removed all
symptoms.
These results imply that for Kintex 7 applications in space,
latch-ups do not pose a threat in the form of lasting damage to
the FPGA. It can be concluded that because of the extremely
low incident rate and low impact on the system, the effects of
latch-ups in the Kintex 7 can effectively be ignored.
B. Total Ionizing Dose effects
The total ionizing dose (TID) effects mostly consist of the
transistors in the FPGA slowly breaking down by particles
hitting the doped silicon and slowly weakening the doping.
This results in the transistors slowing down (and eventually
breaking), resulting in a longer delay in the critical path.
Few elaborate tests have been published researching the
TID effects in the Kintex 7 specifically. However, these test
have been performed on other FPGA devices, such as on the
Lattice ECP3 [9, Fig. 4]. It is likely reasonable to assume
the results for the Kintex 7 would follow a similar pattern:
negligible slowdown up to approximately halfway the device
failure point, after which the slowdown gradually increases up
to the point of total device failure.
The Lattice ECP3, of which test results were mentioned
above, is an FPGA which uses 65nm technology [10]. The
Kintex 7 used in the NCLE project uses 28nm technology.
Perhaps unintuitively so, smaller nanometer technologies are
generally less prone to TID transistor slowdown effects due to
their smaller oxide thickness [11]. This means that the Kintex
7 is unlikely to perform worse than the LFE3-35EA under
similar large ionizing dose conditions.
There is some data available on Kintex 7 TID failure points
and all data points seem to confirm the above mentioned
assumption. One paper presented a Kintex 7 FPGA being
irradiated with 105 MeV protons for a total dose of 17.0 krad
[8] (170 Gy). No functional problems were observed.
In another experiment, two Kintex 7 devices were irradiated
in an attempt at finding the device failure point [12]. The first
broke down after receiving 340 krad (3400 Gy) and one other
still functioned after receiving 446 krad (4460 Gy), after which
the test was aborted. Both tests were performed using high
energy (180 MeV) protons.
As shown in Section IV-A, the expected total mission dose
is less than 10 krad (100 Gy). This is more than 30 times
lower than the lowest observed failure point of a Kintex 7.
Considering these results, it is reasonable to assume TID
effects in the FPGA can be ignored in the NCLE mission.
C. Configuration upsets
Single event upsets (that is: an incidental flip in the state
of an element) can be especially troublesome in an FPGA, as
upsets can affect the state of configuration bits. This means the
logic as composed by the digital gates functionally changes.
Depending on the bit that was struck, this can lead to faulty
data output or bring the system into an erroneous state.
The main technique to combat configuration upsets is
“scrubbing”. This means to constantly compare the active
configuration bits with a protected (duplicated) reference and
to reconfigure blocks where necessary, or by achieving similar
functionality using error correcting code (ECC) bits.
The Kintex 7 used in the NCLE has an on-board configura-
tion scrubber, which is able to correct single-bit errors in one
word, and detect up to two-bit errors. Additionally, a more
advanced single-error mitigation IP core is available, which is
able to correct up to two-bit adjacent errors in one word, and
detect any larger odd-count bit errors in one word, as well
as some larger even-bit errors [13]. In further analysis, it is
assumed this core is used.
Advanced two-bit adjacent error correction relies on storing
additional Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) bits in the device
BRAM. For designs that, unlike the NCLE DRS, use (almost)
all BRAM tiles in the FPGA, this option is not available. In
such cases, all multi-bit upsets should be considered uncor-
rectable.
It is also important to note that the scrubber does not fix
upset bits immediately. The SEM core has a scrubbing latency
of 12.9 ms for the specific FPGA in the NCLE [13], although
this can be increased to save power. There is also a correction
latency of 0.6 ms. This means that whenever a correctable
upset occurs, the system is stuck in an imperfect state for up
to approximately fifteen milliseconds.
D. Expected rate of configuration upsets
Providing a reliable estimate on the amount of expected
errors is not entirely trivial. While there are many papers
available in which relevant radiation test results are presented,
the type and amount of radiation is different from the expected
radiation at the L2 point, to a partially unknown degree.
Test results from literature have shown that for a Kintex 7
device in a 105 MeV proton beam, the effective configuration
upset cross-section is 5.21 · 10−15 cm2/bit [8]. This proton
beam translates to a LET spectrum where approximately 40%
of the events have a LET of at least 1MeV cm2/mg and
10% has a LET of at least 8MeV cm2/mg (similar to the
one shown in [14, Fig. 2]). Comparing this to the expected
mission spectrum shown in Fig. 3, it is clear that the proton
tests are not entirely representative of the expected radiation
environment. In the expected mission spectrum, only one in
ten thousand events have a LET of at least 1MeV cm2/mg
and less than one in a million events have a LET of at least
8MeV cm2/mg.
TABLE II
EXPECTED CONFIGURATION UPSETS AND UNCORRECTABLE MBUS
Situation Configuration upsets Uncorrectable upsets
average 4.4 / week 0.11 / year
worst week 2.5 / hour 0.21 / week
worst day 11.5 / hour 0.14 / day
worst 5 minutes 3.6 / 5min 0.0018 / 5min
Literature has shown that for high LET
(5 − 20 MeV cm2/mg), the configuration cross-section
is reasonably linear with the event energy [4]. However,
extrapolating these results to low energy events might not be
valid; there is insufficient evidence supporting this relation
behaves the same way at low LET.
Applying the 105 MeV proton cross-section as the cross-
section average would mean ignoring the discrepancy between
the beam spectrum and the expected mission spectrum. This
is equivalent to pretending the system impact of particles
hitting the device is larger on average than can reasonably
be assumed. This will result in inflated error estimates; while
unfortunate, it is better to stay on the side of “unrealistic worst-
case” than to end up with an estimate that is significantly too
low. As such, in this paper, the cross-sections measured using
high-energy protons will be considered as valid.
In the concept design of the NCLE digital receiver system
FPGA implementation, approximately 20Mbit of configuration
SRAM is used. This translates to an effective configuration
cross-section of 1.1 ·10−7 cm2. Combining this result with the
flux from Section IV results in the average upset-rates found
in Table II.
E. Multi-bit upsets and correctability
The earlier mentioned configuration scrubber in the Kintex
7 can correct up to two-bit errors, and detect all odd-number
bit errors in a single word. While the bits of different words are
physically interleaved to combat multi-bit upsets in a single
word, these do happen occasionally. In literature, an upset in
multiple bits across different words is sometimes called an
MCU (multi-cell upset), whereas the term MBU (multi-bit
upset) is reserved for upsets which flip multiple bits in a single
word.
Fairly extensive testing has been done to characterize the
multi-bit upset behavior in the Kintex 7 [15]. The tests with
the lowest energy ions used nitrogen and oxygen ions with
an energy of 200MeV , impacting with an average LET of
1.16MeV cm2/mg and 1.54MeV cm2/mg respectively. Out
of the presented tests, these should be most representative of
the expected mission environment. All but one in ten thousand
particle strikes during the mission is expected to have a LET of
less than the average of the ion strikes in these tests, meaning
the test results convey an absolute worst case.
In the nitrogen and oxygen ion tests, average incident rates
of 0.4% and 0.05% were found for 2-bit adjacent MBUs and
3-bit MBUs respectively, as a fraction of all configuration
upsets. The amount of ≥4-bit MBUs and non-adjacent 2-bit
TABLE III
ESTIMATED RESOURCE UTILIZATION
Resource Utilization (% of available)
CLB slices 11250 (44%)
BRAM tiles (36k) 210 (65%)
DSP blocks 400 (67%)
TABLE IV
CROSS-SECTIONS OF VARIOUS SLICES/BLOCKS
Resource Cross-section per unit In concept design
CLB slices 4.22 · 10−14 cm2/slice 0.47 · 10−9 cm2
BRAM tiles 4.81 · 10−11 cm2/tile 10.1 · 10−9 cm2
DSP blocks 9.88 · 10−13 cm2/block 0.40 · 10−9 cm2
MBUs was negligible. The average incident rate of MCUs was
found to be 1.7%. These rates result in a total uncorrectable
configuration cross-section of 5.5 ·10−11 cm2 and a negligible
undetectable cross-section. The expected rate of uncorrectable
upsets during the mission can be found in Table II.
F. Data upsets
Apart from configuration upsets, there are several other
possible single event faults: errors in BRAM, propagated
transients in multipliers and upsets in flip-flops. These errors
are all related to user-data and it is not possible to detect them,
unless logic is specially generated for that purpose.
As with the used configuration memory, the exact utilization
of the BRAM-blocks, DSP-blocks and flip-flops in the final
design is not yet fully known. Estimates were made from
the concept design, which can be found in Table III. Non-
listed sites (such as distributed RAM blocks and Muxes)
have a sufficiently low expected usage that their cross-section
contribution was deemed insignificant. These estimates are
effectively the resource utilization of the concept design,
rounded up slightly.
Cross-sections in a proton beam for BRAM upsets, DSP
blocks and CLB slices (which contain LUTs and Flip Flops)
are available from literature, obtained in similar conditions as
the configuration memory cross-section results used in Section
V-D.
The cross-sections for BRAM upsets, DSP blocks, and logic
slices for a Kintex 7 7K325T were determined in literature as
2.17 ·10−9 cm2/device (logic slices), 0.83 ·10−9 cm2/device
(DSP blocks) and 21.4 · 10−9 cm2/device (BRAM) for full
utilization of those respective parts [8]. The device under test
in this paper was a larger FPGA than the 7K160T in the NCLE
system, so some conversion is necessary.
Results from converting the cross-sections to per unit and
full design cross-sections are shown in Table IV. Note that
while it provides a convenient intermediate step in calculating
the design cross-section from device cross-sections, converting
the per device cross-sections to per logical slice cross-sections
is somewhat fictitious, as many of these components are not
truly separate blocks on the FPGA.
Adding all of these cross-sections together results in a total
user data cross-section of 1.09 · 10−8 cm2, which happens to
TABLE V
EXPECTED RATE OF DATA UPSETS
Situation Data upsets per day
average 6.3 · 10−2 (∼= 1.9 per month)
worst week 6.1
worst day 27.8 (∼= 1.2 per hour)
worst 5 minutes 103.6 (∼= 4.3 per hour)
be almost exactly 10% of the effective configuration cross-
section. The resulting expected upset rate in the user data for
various situations is given in Table V.
VI. FAULT IMPACT
An important note to keep in mind is that various upsets
can have significantly different effects. For example, a config-
uration upset may add a data wire to an unconnected block, or
a BRAM bit may upset right before data has been written to
it. Neither upset has any effect on the system function. Such
errors can be considered non-critical.
A. Critical cross-section
The effective cross-section for upsets which impact the
system results in any way is considered as the critical cross-
section. This is composed of the critical cross-sections for both
configuration and data upsets.
The fraction of essential configuration bits (i.e., the bits
which influence the system functionality when upset) as per-
centage of the total amount of configuration bits is called
device vulnerability factor (DVF). This can be determined
from a design using Xilinx tools. The DVF can be assumed to
never exceed 10% [1]. As there is not yet a functional design
available at the time of writing, the worst case is assumed.
This means that for every ten configuration bits flipped, only
one will have any functional effect. As shown in Section V-E,
the incident rate of multi-bit upsets is only 1.7%, meaning the
percentage of upsets causing essential configuration bits to
flip is approximately equal to the DVF. The resulting critical
cross-section for configuration upsets is 1.1 · 10−8cm2.
The data upset cross-section is dominated by BRAM upsets,
but the critical cross-section for these upsets could not be
determined: the fraction of upsets that are critical heavily
depends on the application running on the FPGA. No relevant
testing has been performed to determine this fraction for the
NCLE application, as it is not yet complete or functional at the
time of writing. For this reason, all data upsets are assumed to
be critical. The resulting critical cross-section for data upsets is
1.09 · 10−8cm2, identical to the total data upset cross-section
given in Section V-F. This results in a total critical cross-
section of 2.2 · 10−8cm2.
B. Semi-critical versus severely critical cross-section
While non-critical upsets are completely uniform, there is a
scale of severity in critical upsets. Most critical configuration
upsets that are corrected by the scrubber after several millisec-
onds might influence several data points, but these errors will
likely disappear in averaging the large amount of data points.
However, uncorrectable configuration upsets and correctable
upsets in certain parts of the control logic will cause the system
to enter and stay in an incorrect state.
The semi-critical cross-section can be defined as the cross-
section for upsets that result in a minor system error. What
classifies as “minor” is unique for each system. For the NCLE
DRS, any error which does not interrupt or impede the science
modes and which does not significantly influence the gathered
results can be considered a minor error. This translates to all
correctable critical configuration upsets in most of the system,
with the exception of small control parts.
Conversely, a “severe” error is any error which does sig-
nificantly influence gathered science data. For uncorrectable
upsets, this means faulty data points being accumulated until
the device is reconfigured.
For critical upsets in control logic, it is likely that the science
mode run produces some sort of invalid data. It is also possible
the run finishes prematurely, never finishes at all, or even
overwrites data gathered in previous science modes stored
in flash because of a fault in an address calculation. While
all of these errors are severe, the latter two are potentially
catastrophic. It is unreasonable to assume these catastrophic
errors form a significant portion of the severe errors, but the
possibility of their occurrence should be taken into account.
Putting a number on the amount of configuration bits that
would result in a severe error when upset is difficult, as it is
extremely application specific. A reliable way would be exten-
sive testing using fault injection, which is not possible without
a semi-final design. For the NCLE DRS design, correctable
critical upsets inside of the FFT and filter calculations would
not result in a severe system fault, and hardware for these
calculations make up the grand majority of the area on the
FPGA. Because of this, the assumption is made that no more
than 25% of the critical upsets result in a severe system error.
For data upsets, a similar problem exists: far from all critical
data upsets result in a severe system error, but the fraction is
hard to estimate without extensive testing. A small amount of
data consists of matters like filter coefficients and loop control
variables, which could result in severe propagated errors when
upset.
Most of the BRAM tiles (which have the highest contri-
bution to the data upset cross-section by far) are used for
storing partially processed sample data. There is not enough
insight about the final design available at the time of writing
to give a precise estimate on what the severely critical fraction
is, but preliminary investigations show that 10% should be a
reasonable worst-case figure.
C. Calculation of semi- and severely critical cross-sections
The semi-critical cross-section, if defined as a superset of
the severely critical cross-section, encompasses all critical
configuration upsets (1.1 · 10−8cm2) in addition to all data
upsets (also 1.1 · 10−8cm2). The resulting approximate cross-
section is 2.2 · 10−8cm2.
The severely critical cross-section encompasses all critical
vital configuration upsets and critical uncorrectable upsets
TABLE VI
EXPECTED CRITICAL UPSETS (CONFIGURATION & DATA)
Situation Critical upsets Severely critical Undetectable
average 3.8/month 8.1/year 1.9/month
worst week 6.0/day 2.1/day 3.0/day
worst day 2.3/hour 9.9/day 1.2/hour
worst 5 minutes 0.72/5 min 0.13/5 min 0.36/5 min
(2.8 · 10−9cm2), as well as all critical vital data upsets
(1.1 · 10−9cm2), resulting in a total cross-section of approxi-
mately 3.9 · 10−9cm2.
The resulting incident rates can be found in Table VI.
While a significant part of these results is based on very
rough estimates, they can reasonably be considered worst-case
numbers.
D. Critical undetectable cross-section
The critical cross-section can be further split up into two
parts: the detectable and the undetectable critical cross-section.
This distinction is useful, as even severe functional problems
can largely be mitigated as long as they are detectable, simply
by marking the data produced in the rest of the science mode
run as (possibly) invalid. However, for undetectable upsets,
this is not an option, meaning they can spoil data without the
system being able to mark spoilt data as such.
The undetectable configuration upsets are all MBUs that
flip more an even number above three bits in one word. As
mentioned in Section V-E, the cross-section for this event is
negligible.
The data upsets are all assumed undetectable. This means
the undetectable cross-section is the same as the critical data
upsets for both the semi-critical undetectable cross-section
(1.1 · 10−8cm2) and the severely critical undetectable cross-
section (1.1 · 10−9cm2).
VII. NECESSITY OF ADDITIONAL FAULT TOLERANCE
TECHNIQUES IN THE NCLE DRS
The presented expectations for upset rates and fault rates can
be used to answer the question whether any additional fault
tolerance techniques in the FPGA are strictly necessary for
successful completion of the science objectives of the NCLE
mission.
A. Practical problems and solutions
Considering Table VI, the answer to the above question is
not a simple yes or no. While the data conveys a near-worst-
case scenario, the estimated number of severe critical upsets is
significant: approximately 40 over the total five-year mission
duration. This is the amount of times an entire science mode
run is expected to be corrupted or interrupted. As long as none
of these events are catastrophic errors which lock up the DRS
or destroy significant portions of the measurement data, this
should not be enough to compromise any of the science goals.
While known to be small, the exact fraction of severe errors
causing such catastrophic faults is unknown, so implementing
the system without any sort of measures to protect against
these events would pose an unacceptable risk.
Preferably, measures should also be taken to mitigate the
impact of semi-critical events. Upsets that flip the most signif-
icant bits of only few samples could have a significant impact
on results of long accumulation. With in the worst case 230
of these events, this could influence the science data to an
unacceptable degree.
B. Possibilities for semi-critical upset impact mitigation
While, as shown in Section V-E, virtually all configuration
upsets are detectable and almost all are correctable, properly
recovering from a configuration upset is not trivial. Any data
that passed through a struck gate between discovery and the
time of the last scrubbing pass can no longer be trusted.
The SEM core has a scrubbing latency of 12.9 ms for the
FPGA in the NCLE [13]. To recover, the system would have to
either be able to fully roll back to a state from 14ms earlier,
or employ (triple) redundant calculations to fall back on in
case of a fault. Considering the tight area and power budgets,
neither of these is a viable option.
Most science modes accumulate large amounts of samples
into single data points. These could store intermediate accu-
mulations (over a time period that is significantly smaller than
the expected upset rate) into separate memory locations, as
opposed to keeping a single updating data block in flash. The
storage budget is fairly large: storing intermediate accumu-
lations for every separate minute would not be prohibitive.
By generating metadata for each intermediate accumulation
on whether upsets were detected during its collection, faulty
intermediates can be filtered out.
It is possible to do this on a more local scale. Due to their
accumulating nature, regularly dropping a few milliseconds
of data is not a problem in most science modes. A possibility
would be to accumulate results from several milliseconds in an
intermediate accumulator, only adding them to the final result
if no upsets are detected during that time. The disadvantage
is that the data is actually thrown away, instead of marked as
possibly faulty.
The SEM core provides functionality for classifying upsets
by checking them to a list of essential bits stored in external
storage. This requires the SEM core to interface with the flash
memory, and implementing it is a significant amount of work.
Due to the short lead-time of the project and low priority of
this feature, it will possibly not be implemented. This means
that when using the above approach, approximately ten times
too many data windows would be dropped. As shown in
Table II, non-critical configuration upsets have an expected
occurrence rate below once a minute during the worst five
minutes of the mission, meaning dropping several milliseconds
of data ten times too often is not a large problem.
For science modes where a high temporal resolution (order
of milliseconds) is necessary, the previous approach is not an
option. These modes can not run for much longer than a few
seconds, as the bandwidth to get that much data back to Earth
is not available. A realistic alternative is to simply assume
the system does not experience any upsets in relevant bits
during that time. Even during the worst possible hour of the
mission, the average time to a critical upset is approximately
25 minutes; significantly longer than these measurements take.
As with storing intermediate accumulations, each run can be
marked with metadata on whether upsets were detected during
the collection of the data. Even data collected while the system
was influenced by an upset is likely valuable to some extent
(especially since most upsets are non-critical) and the decision
to use it can be made on Earth.
C. Severely critical upset mitigation
Due to the extremely low incident rate, an acceptable
response to severely critical upsets in the system would be
to drop all tasks and request a power cycle from the CDHS.
However, classifying the severity of detected upsets possibly
poses a problem and not all severely critical upsets are
detectable in the first place.
It is possible to decrease the incident rate of severe incidents
by using traditional fault-tolerance techniques such as TMR.
With the incident rates of critical faults, getting simultaneous
faults in two voters can be considered statistically impossible,
as long as they are not placed adjacently.
The small area and power budgets are less of a problem
in this case, as the severely critical sections use only a small
fraction of both of these budgets. Implementing TMR in the
severely critical sections would eradicate the grand majority of
the severely critical faults from the system, both those caused
by configuration upsets as well as those caused by data upsets.
D. Catastrophic event mitigation
As catastrophic events are mostly comprised of a small sub-
set of severely critical upsets, selectively applied TMR would
drive down incident rate significantly. While the catastrophic
cross-section should be close to negligible, some possibility
for catastrophic errors still remains, mostly in the Kintex 7
system bits that cause full functional interruption when upset.
The cross-section for functional interruption events in the
Kintex 7 is significantly smaller than the cross-section for
latch-ups [7], which was considered negligible in section V-A.
However, due to the catastrophic nature of these events, some
sort of mitigation is in order. An option is establishing a “heart-
beat” line to the CDHS, which can reconfigure and power
cycle the FPGA, to automatically trigger a reset whenever this
heartbeat line goes flat.
To offer further protection, this heartbeat could carry addi-
tional information about the DRS system state: if a science
mode run takes longer than it should, CDHS could respond
similar to the heartbeat going flat.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It has been shown reasonable to expect a significant amount
of upsets in the NCLE DRS during the mission, but few are
expected to be critical, and even fewer are expected to pos-
sibly compromise the mission goals. When using the built-in
scrubber of the Kintex 7 as the only radiation error mitigation,
there would be a small but non-zero risk of catastrophic events
in the FPGA endangering the acquisition of valid science data
for the NCLE mission.
The most troubling risks were addressed with simple, real-
istic, low-overhead mitigation options. Assuming the proposed
mitigation options (or similar ones) are implemented, radiation
related errors in the DRS FPGA are extremely unlikely to
compromise the science goals of the NCLE mission.
A simple approach has been presented to analyse the
expected radiation-related system faults in Kintex 7 FPGA
devices when used in space missions. Furthermore, it has
been shown that such an analysis can prove useful in saving
power on computationally expensive fault tolerance techniques
in situations where a small power budget is available.
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